Bangladesh: A Crisis with Implications for NE Region of Indian Sub-Continent!

Bangladesh: A Crisis with Far-Reaching Implications for NE Region of Indian Sub-Continent and Beyond

ANJAN SARMA

On August 5, 2024, the political landscape of Bangladesh was dramatically reshaped when Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled Dhaka by military helicopter amidst escalating protests.

Weeks of unrest, which resulted in nearly 300 fatalities, culminated in her resignation and subsequent departure to India, a country that has long been both her refuge and her staunchest ally. The fallout from Hasina’s resignation is already being felt, not only in Bangladesh but across the border in India, particularly in the strategically significant Northeastern region.

The crisis is reverberating far beyond South Asia, posing complex challenges for regional stability, diplomatic relations, and the delicate balance of power in the region.

India’s Historical Ties with Hasina

Sheikh Hasina’s relationship with India is deeply rooted in history, marked by mutual support and shared strategic interests. After the assassination of her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and most of her family in 1975, Hasina spent years in exile in India, which provided her with sanctuary during some of her most trying times.

This bond between Hasina and India persisted throughout her political career, with New Delhi viewing her as a crucial ally in maintaining regional stability and countering Pakistan’s influence in South Asia.

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Hasina’s leadership has been instrumental in fostering close ties between Bangladesh and India. Under her government, the two countries enjoyed a robust diplomatic relationship characterized by extensive cooperation in areas such as trade, security, and infrastructure development. Her government worked closely with India to restore transportation links severed after the 1947 partition, including roads, railways, and river routes that enhanced connectivity between the two nations.

When Hasina arrived at an air force base near New Delhi following her resignation, she was received by Ajit Doval, India’s National Security Advisor, underscoring the importance India places on its relationship with the deposed leader.

However, Hasina’s abrupt departure from Bangladesh and the subsequent establishment of an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has introduced a period of uncertainty, both in Dhaka and in New Delhi. The warmth that characterized Indo-Bangladesh relations under Hasina’s leadership is now at risk of cooling, with far-reaching consequences for regional stability.

The Impact on Indo-Bangladesh Relations

The departure of Sheikh Hasina is seen as a significant setback for India. Hasina’s government was a dependable partner in the region, aligning closely with India’s strategic objectives, particularly in counterbalancing China’s growing influence in South Asia. Her decision to choose India over China for a $1 billion river development project was a clear indication of her alignment with New Delhi.

Additionally, the power sector deal between Bangladesh and India’s Adani Group, despite its controversy within Bangladesh, highlighted the intertwined economic interests of the two nations.

However, the transition to an interim government has introduced a degree of frostiness in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Reports of non-essential staff being withdrawn from India’s high commission in Dhaka are indicative of the underlying tensions. The Indian government’s concern over the potential rise of a Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government under Khaleda Zia, which could marginalize the Hindu minority and reverse the secular policies of the Awami League, is palpable.

The interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, represents a departure from the pro-India stance that Hasina maintained. Yunus, while internationally respected for his work in microfinance, may steer Bangladesh in a direction less favorable to India, potentially reopening the door for increased Chinese influence in the region. This shift could disrupt the delicate balance of power in South Asia, challenging India’s strategic position and complicating its foreign policy objectives.

Repercussions for  Northeast part of Indian Sub-Continent

The political instability in Bangladesh has sent ripples across  northeastern states of the Indian Subcontinent, which share an extensive border with Bangladesh. The North East Students’ Organisation (NESO), a conglomeration of student bodies from the region, and NEIPF (North East Indigenous peoples Forum) has voiced its concerns to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, urging the government to prevent any influx of refugees from the crisis-stricken nation.

They emphasizes the historical context of illegal immigration from Bangladesh, which has led to significant demographic shifts and social unrest in states like Assam, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland ,Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya.

Fears are not unfounded. The Northeast has long borne the brunt of immigration from Bangladesh, dating back to the partition of 1947 and the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. These events led to an influx of Bengali migrants, creating tensions with the indigenous populations. In Tripura, for instance, the indigenous tribal population has been reduced to a minority, fueling long-standing grievances over land rights and political representation.

Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio has also sounded the alarm, highlighting that Assam and Tripura are particularly vulnerable to infiltration given their geographical proximity to Bangladesh. The situation has prompted NESO to call for stringent border controls and a commitment from the central government to protect the interests of the indigenous communities in the region.

The implications of a refugee crisis are profound for Northeastern Region. The region has already experienced significant demographic changes due to past waves of migration, leading to tensions between indigenous communities and migrants. The fear of further demographic shifts exacerbates existing insecurities, potentially leading to increased social unrest and ethnic violence.

Moreover, the influx of refugees could strain already limited resources, heightening competition for jobs, land, and basic services, which could further destabilize the region.

A Diplomatic Dilemma for India

The unfolding crisis in Bangladesh presents India with a complex diplomatic challenge. On one hand, India has a vested interest in maintaining stability in Bangladesh, given the deep economic and security ties between the two countries. On the other hand, the rise of a potentially hostile government in Dhaka, coupled with the possibility of increased migration into India’s already volatile Northeast, could have serious ramifications for regional stability.

Former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, writing in the Indian Express, suggested that India’s best course of action might be to adopt a wait-and-see approach while reaffirming its commitment to the people of Bangladesh. However, this strategy may not suffice in addressing the immediate concerns of the northeastern region, where any increase in illegal immigration could exacerbate existing tensions and fuel further unrest.

The situation is further complicated by the broader geopolitical context. India’s foreign policy, increasingly influenced by domestic political considerations, has alienated some of its traditional allies. The shift away from secularism under the current Indian government has not gone unnoticed in Bangladesh, where protests erupted during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2021 visit, highlighting the growing discontent with India’s perceived drift towards Hindu nationalism.

India’s diplomatic challenge is not just about managing its relationship with Bangladesh but also about addressing the concerns of its northeastern states, which feel particularly vulnerable in this volatile situation. The central government’s response to these concerns will be critical in determining the stability of the region. A failure to adequately address the anxieties of the Northeast could lead to internal unrest, further complicating India’s ability to manage its external relations with Bangladesh.

The Assam Agitation and the Legacy of the Assam Accord

The six-year-long Assam agitation, a defining chapter in the history of Assam and the broader Northeast, was primarily driven by the demand to identify and deport illegal Bangladeshi immigrants residing in the state. This agitation, led by the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), began as a non-violent movement but later escalated into violent confrontations.

The roots of this movement can be traced back to the 1960s when the demand for identifying illegal settlers, who were increasingly finding their way into electoral rolls, started gaining momentum in Assam. The immediate trigger for the agitation, however, was the discovery in 1979 of over 45,000 + illegal immigrants on the electoral rolls of the Mangaldoi Lok Sabha constituency.

This revelation sparked widespread civil disobedience across Assam, leading to railway blockades, attacks on oil pipelines, political instability, and ethnic violence. The agitation reached its peak between 1979 and 1985, with operations by security forces resulting in the deaths of over 850 student leaders and the infamous Nellie and Khoirabari massacres of 1983 claiming over 2,000 lives.

The movement culminated in the signing of the Assam Accord on 15 August 1985, a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) between representatives of the Government of India and the leaders of the Assam Movement. This agreement aimed to address the concerns of the Assamese people regarding illegal immigration and protect the state’s cultural, social, and economic identity.

The Assam Accord introduced several measures to address the issue of illegal immigration. It classified foreigners into three categories for identification and differential treatment. Those who had come to Assam before 1 January 1966, including those on the electoral rolls used in the 1967 elections, were to be regularized.

Those who arrived between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971 were to be detected under the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, and were to be disenfranchised. They were required to register as foreigners under the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939, and could regain voting rights only after ten years from their detection or declaration as foreigners. The rest were to be expelled from the state.

The Citizenship (Amendment) Act and the NRC

The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (CAA), introduced a new dimension to the debate on citizenship in Assam and the Northeast. The CAA provides a path to Indian citizenship for illegal migrants belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, or Christian communities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, who entered India on or before 31 December 2014. Certain areas in the Northeast are exempted from this provision.

The CAA, when combined with the National Register of Citizens (NRC), has sparked fears among the indigenous people of Assam and the Northeast that the influx of Hindu Bangladeshi migrants, who may be granted citizenship under the CAA, could undermine their cultural identity. The NRC process, which aims to identify illegal immigrants, has been controversial and has further fueled tensions in the region.

The NRC, initially implemented in Assam to update the list of Indian citizens and identify illegal immigrants, has been fraught with challenges. The final list, published in August 2019, left out nearly 1.9 million people, creating anxiety and uncertainty among those excluded. While the NRC was intended to address the concerns of illegal immigration, its implementation has been criticized for its potential to exacerbate social tensions and disrupt communal harmony.

The combination of the CAA and NRC has led to widespread protests in Assam and other parts of the Northeast. The region, already sensitive to demographic changes, perceives these measures as a threat to its unique cultural and linguistic identity. The protests have been particularly intense in Assam, where memories of the Assam agitation are still fresh, and the fear of being overwhelmed by immigrants remains a potent issue.

The All Assam Students’ Union (AASU), 30 Ethnic Organisations of Assam and the people of Assam are opposing the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 since the days of its Bill form in 2015. The AASU and the other organizations firmly opposed the Bill 2015 when it was referred to a parliamentary committee.

The AASU and the people of Assam oppose the Act on two main premises. AASU has filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the CAA. In fact, the AASU is the first party in  opposing the Act from North East.

The first premise is that it fundamentally violates the secular preamble of our constitution. India is a secular country not only in word, but also in spirit. Our secular values are not confined to the geographical boundary of our country. Our constitution transcends our borders. That is why we are known as a democratic country in the world.  It is incumbent upon us to also appear to be a secular country in our thoughts and acts beyond our borders.

The CAA goes against the secular spirit of our constitution. The Act distorts our social fabric and constraints our values. We have full faith that the Hon’ble Supreme Court will protect the secular values the country cherishes and will not allow the operation of this partisan and arbitrary Act passed by the ruling NDA. This narrative is reigning in the country among the democracy loving populace of the country.

AASU and the people of Assam oppose the CAA on another important premise. This is different from the rest of the country.

The CAA totally violates the historic Assam Accord which was signed on 15 August 1985 between the Government of India, Government of Assam and the All Assam Students’ Union and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad to solve the illegal foreigners’ problem after the historic Assam Movement. It was signed to acknowledge the threat to the identity of the indigenous people of Assam due to the unabated influx of the illegal foreigners from Bangladesh, and to move towards a solution.

Clause 5.8 of the Assam Accord is as follows:“5.8 Foreigners who came to Assam on or after 25March 1971 shall continue to be detected, deleted and expelled in accordance with law. Immediate and practical steps shall be taken to expel such foreigners.”

The constitutional date for citizenship was 19 July 1948. Anyone entering India after this date was a foreigner, irrespective of his/her religion. But Assam accected the burden of 1951 to 1971 of illegal foreigners (both Hindus and Muslims) entering Assam from the then East Pakistan. Assam accepted the burden on behalf of the country keeping in mind the national commitment, international agreements and the humanitarian consideration.

The ASSU oppose the CAA on the following grounds:

1. The Assam Accord does not distinguish a foreigner on the basis of his religion. The CAA discriminates in religion.

Assam agreed to keep the 1951-71 stream of foreigners after regularization. The CAA has set a new date of 31 December 2014, thereby, violating the core provision of Assam Accord and imposing an additional burden of illegal foreigners from 1971 to 2014.

The violation of the historic Assam Accord and imposition of additional burden are NOT acceptable to us. This is the cause of the present non-violent mass movement in Assam against CAA.

The Assam Accord promised safeguards for the Assamese in clause 6:

 “6. Constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards, as may be appropriate, shall be provided to protect, preserve and promote the cultural, social, linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people.”          

The safeguards were envisaged because Assam agreed to bear the burden of the illegal foreigners who entered Assam between 1951 and 1971.

The safeguards are NOT for imposition of the additional burden between 1971 and 2014.

The safeguards are NOT for bargaining for acceptance of the CAA.

The AASU and the people of Assam do not accept the CAA, and will never accept the CAA.

Even though in Assam, the mass movement is peaceful and non-violent, but the Government is adopting an attitude of high handedness through aggressive and repressive measures towards the peaceful protestors resulting to the death of five innocent lives ( police firing), scores were injured, tortured in custody, false cases were framed against the leaders and protestors, curtailment of internet freedom but at the same time the Government is keeping silent on the provocative and violent statements of the leaders of the ruling party.

 It has violated the human rights of the indigenous people of Assam by threatening their political right, culture and the overall social identity. Finally, the number matters in a democracy. When the indigenous people are over-run in numbers in the immediate future, their culture, languages and identity will lose the present status.

 The CAA has a proviso, wherein the states with Inner Line Permit regulations and 6^th Schedule areas are exempted from the implementation of this Act, as it was understood on the reason that CAA is bad and will have a negative impact on the demography of these areas, so the question is ? If CAA is bad for the exempted areas, then how can it be good for the other areas of Assam? This is just a ploy to hoodwink and mislead the people.

 Assam shares a long and porous border of 268kms with Bangladesh, the illegal infiltrators from Bangladesh can enter easily into Assam as the border is not sealed and manned as it is supposed to be as per the Assam Accord. We can easily compare the fencing and guarding of the border in the West of the country to the border to the East of the country, it is an inexcusable crime on the part of the Government of India.

 The CAA has violated the UN Declaration of Rights for the Indigenous Peoples to which India is a signatory. The Declaration bars governments, the signatories, from doing anything which affects the identity and obliterates the rights of the indigenous people anywhere on the globe. The CAA will precisely inflict this injury to the indigenous people of Assam.

The Way Forward

As the crisis in Bangladesh unfolds, India finds itself at a crossroads. The Indian government must navigate a delicate balancing act, managing its relationship with the interim government in Dhaka while addressing the concerns of its northeastern states. The stakes are high, and the decisions made in the coming weeks will have long-lasting implications for regional stability, diplomatic relations, and domestic harmony.

For India, the immediate priority is to ensure that the situation in Bangladesh does not lead to an influx of refugees into the Northeast region. Strengthening border controls, engaging with the interim government in Dhaka, and providing humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh are essential steps in managing the crisis. At the same time, India must address the concerns of its northeastern states, ensuring that their cultural and demographic integrity is protected.

The broader challenge for India lies in maintaining its strategic position in South Asia. The rise of a government in Bangladesh that is less favorable to India could disrupt the regional balance of power and open the door for increased Chinese influence. India may therefore engage diplomatically with the interim government while preparing for the possibility of a more hostile administration in Dhaka.

The political upheaval in Bangladesh is a crisis with far-reaching implications for India and the broader region. The situation demands a nuanced and multi-faceted response, one that balances strategic interests with humanitarian concerns and domestic sensitivities. As the crisis continues to unfold, the decisions made by India will play a crucial role in shaping the future of South Asia.

12-08-2024

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