COP31 and the Climate Justice Fault Line

From Antalya to the Eastern Himalayas, the world is entering a decisive phase in which climate diplomacy must confront a widening gap between promises and implementation. As temperatures rise, glaciers destabilise and the Brahmaputra continues to reshape Assam, the central question is no longer simply how much the world can reduce emissions, but who will pay for the damage already unfolding.

PAHARI BARUAH

The next United Nations climate conference will open in Antalya, Türkiye, from November 9 to 20, 2026, at a moment when the climate system appears to be moving faster than international politics. COP31 will be the 31st session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the principal multilateral forum through which governments negotiate collective responses to global warming. Yet the significance of Antalya will extend far beyond another round of diplomatic declarations. The conference arrives as governments confront record temperatures, mounting adaptation costs, widening climate-finance gaps and a growing number of disasters in regions that contributed comparatively little to the accumulation of greenhouse gases.

The geography of COP31 is itself revealing. Türkiye will host the conference and provide the COP President, while Australia will lead the negotiations as President of Negotiations. The unusual arrangement emerged from a compromise between the two countries after both sought to host COP31. Under the formal Türkiye-Australia partnership modalities, the Turkish representative will serve as COP President while the Australian representative will serve as President of Negotiations with exclusive authority over the negotiation process, with both sides committed to consultation.

This division of responsibility places two countries with very different geographical and political relationships to climate change at the centre of the same conference. Türkiye is increasingly exposed to heat, drought, wildfire and water stress, while Australia is simultaneously accelerating renewable energy deployment and remaining deeply dependent on fossil fuels and a major exporter of them. The contradiction is hardly unique to these two countries. It reflects the central difficulty of the global transition itself, in which governments are attempting to reduce emissions while protecting energy security, industrial competitiveness, employment and economic stability.

The Pacific will also have a more visible place on the road to Antalya. A Pre-COP process in Fiji will bring Pacific countries and Australia together before the main conference, placing the concerns of island states closer to the negotiating process. For countries facing rising seas, saltwater intrusion, stronger storms and the possible loss of inhabited land, climate change is not primarily a question of long-term policy modelling. It is already a question of territory, livelihoods, sovereignty and survival.

The conference arrives at a dangerous moment

The scientific backdrop to COP31 is increasingly difficult to ignore. The World Meteorological Organization has confirmed that 2015 to 2025 were the eleven warmest years in the instrumental record and that 2025 was among the three warmest years ever recorded. Its consolidated assessment placed the global mean surface temperature in 2025 at approximately 1.44°C above the 1850 to 1900 average, while the three-year average for 2023 to 2025 was approximately 1.48°C above that baseline.

The next few years could be even more consequential. The WMO’s Global Annual to Decadal Climate Update projects annual global temperatures between 2026 and 2030 in the range of 1.3°C to 1.9°C above the 1850 to 1900 average. It estimates a 91 per cent probability that at least one year during this period will temporarily exceed 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level. That does not mean that the Paris Agreement’s long-term 1.5°C threshold has technically been breached by one or several individual years, but it demonstrates how close the climate system has moved to a level once described primarily as a future danger.

The more uncomfortable assessment comes from the United Nations Environment Programme. Its 2025 Emissions Gap Report estimates that full implementation of current nationally determined contributions would still place the world on a trajectory of approximately 2.3°C to 2.5°C warming this century, while current policies point towards about 2.8°C. UNEP concludes that a higher exceedance of 1.5°C is now very likely within the next decade, although rapid reductions could limit the magnitude and duration of the overshoot.

This is why the 1.5°C goal should not be dismissed simply because temporary overshoot has become increasingly probable. Every fraction of a degree still matters. A warmer world means greater risks to ecosystems, food systems, water security, human health and infrastructure, and the difference between 1.5°C, 2°C and higher levels of warming is not merely numerical. It represents progressively greater exposure to hazards that become harder and more expensive to manage.

The political implication is that mitigation and adaptation can no longer be treated as sequential stages. Governments must continue cutting emissions rapidly while simultaneously preparing populations for impacts that can no longer be avoided. Climate diplomacy is therefore moving into an uncomfortable era in which prevention and survival have to be pursued at the same time.

The contradiction at the centre of Antalya

The geopolitical difficulty becomes clearer when energy systems are examined. Australia is expanding renewable generation, but fossil fuels still occupy a dominant position in its energy economy. Official Australian data show that renewable sources supplied 39.6 per cent of electricity generation in 2025, while fossil fuels still accounted for 60.4 per cent of generation. Fossil fuels also represented almost 90 per cent of Australia’s primary energy consumption in 2024-25. The country therefore approaches COP31 carrying both the credentials of an accelerating energy transition and the economic weight of a major fossil-fuel producer and exporter.

Türkiye faces its own transition challenge. Coal remains an important component of its energy system, even as the country expands renewable energy and promotes efficiency, electrification and circular-economy policies. The broader lesson is that the transition is not occurring in a world where fossil fuels can simply be switched off overnight. It is taking place inside economies whose industries, transport systems, electricity networks and public finances have developed around fossil energy.

This is why the language of COP31 will matter. Electrification can reduce emissions from transport, buildings and industry, but its climate benefits depend on how electricity is generated. Circular economy policies can reduce waste and resource pressures, but they cannot substitute for deep reductions in fossil-fuel combustion. Energy efficiency can reduce demand, but it must be accompanied by structural changes in how energy is produced and consumed.

Türkiye’s emphasis on zero waste and the circular economy is therefore relevant to the broader climate conversation. The COP31 Action Agenda places circular economy approaches, waste reduction and methane reduction among its priorities, alongside electrification, resilient cities, clean-energy systems and other implementation-oriented themes. The challenge will be to convert these priorities into measurable reductions in emissions and material consumption rather than allowing them to remain primarily diplomatic vocabulary.

The harder political question concerns fossil fuels themselves. Countries have repeatedly struggled to agree on language that directly addresses the transition away from coal, oil and gas, partly because national economies have very different levels of dependence on fossil energy. For developing countries, the question is also inseparable from the principle that countries with greater historical emissions and greater financial capacity should carry a larger share of the transition burden.

The American withdrawal and the question of leadership

COP31 will also take place in the shadow of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. The US government notified the United Nations of its decision to withdraw in January 2025, and the withdrawal became effective on January 27, 2026, in accordance with the Paris Agreement’s procedures. The decision reflected the Trump administration’s broader argument that international environmental commitments should not impose what it regarded as unfair economic burdens on the United States.

The significance of the withdrawal extends beyond American domestic politics. The United States is one of the world’s largest historical and contemporary greenhouse-gas emitters and has traditionally been one of the most influential actors in international climate finance and diplomacy. Its withdrawal therefore raises questions about the continuity of climate finance, the credibility of long-term commitments and the ability of the multilateral system to maintain momentum when domestic political cycles produce abrupt changes in international policy.

For developing countries, this uncertainty intersects with a much older dispute over equity. The Paris Agreement is built around the recognition that countries have common responsibilities but different national circumstances and capabilities. The broader principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities has been central to the climate negotiations because countries entered the modern industrial era with vastly different levels of historical emissions, wealth and technological capacity.

The IPCC’s emissions data illustrate the scale of the historical imbalance. Between 1850 and 2019, developed countries accounted for approximately 57 per cent of cumulative CO₂ emissions, while least-developed countries accounted for only about 0.4 per cent. At the same time, many of the world’s most climate-vulnerable populations live in countries and regions with much smaller historical contributions to atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations.

That imbalance does not mean that developing countries have no responsibility for present and future emissions. Nor does it mean that historical responsibility alone can determine today’s climate policy. It does mean that the transition cannot be separated from questions of capacity, finance and fairness.

The argument becomes particularly powerful when the global map is compared with the physical geography of climate impacts.

When the Himalaya becomes a warning system

On August 26, 2026, Nepal experienced a disaster that offered a stark illustration of the vulnerability of the Hindu Kush Himalaya. A mountain-face collapse in the Langtang Lirung area triggered an ice-rock avalanche and debris flow that moved into the Lhende Khola and subsequently affected the Bhote Koshi and Trishuli river systems.

ICIMOD has stressed that the event should not technically be described simply as a conventional glacial-lake outburst flood. The distinction matters scientifically, but the larger warning is unmistakable: increasingly unstable mountain environments can generate cascading hazards capable of overwhelming settlements and infrastructure in a matter of minutes.

The disaster demonstrated the interaction between cryospheric change, steep terrain, infrastructure concentration and human settlement. Roads, bridges, hydropower projects, transmission systems and communities increasingly occupy valleys where natural processes can change rapidly. As climate change modifies glaciers, snow, precipitation patterns and slope stability, the risk environment becomes more complicated even where the precise trigger of an individual event cannot be attributed to climate change alone.

The Hindu Kush Himalaya is often described as the water tower of Asia, but its importance extends beyond water supply. ICIMOD’s assessments show a region experiencing profound changes in glaciers, snow and permafrost, with consequences for downstream water availability, hazards and ecosystems. More than two billion people live downstream of the mountains and depend directly or indirectly upon the rivers and ecosystems originating there.

The lesson from Nepal is therefore not that every landslide, avalanche or flood can be attributed to global warming. Climate science does not support such a simplistic interpretation. The lesson is that warming is changing the background conditions under which hazards occur, while development is increasing the number and value of assets exposed to them.

The Himalaya is becoming not merely a source of water but an increasingly important indicator of how climate change interacts with geography, infrastructure and human vulnerability.

From the mountains to Assam

The connection between the Himalaya and Assam is written into the geography of the Brahmaputra. The river rises on the Tibetan Plateau, gathers water from the Eastern Himalaya and its tributaries, crosses Arunachal Pradesh and Assam and eventually enters Bangladesh. A change in the mountains therefore does not end at the mountain front. It travels downstream through sediment, water, river morphology and human settlements.

Assam has always lived with floods. The Brahmaputra is a naturally dynamic river system shaped by enormous monsoon flows, sediment loads, channel migration, erosion and the complex geology of the region. Climate change should not be used as a convenient explanation for every flood. Human settlement, embankments, land-use change, wetland degradation and river engineering also influence the scale of vulnerability.

But the underlying risk is enormous.

According to the Government of Assam’s Water Resources Department, about 31,500 square kilometres of the state, or 39.58 per cent of its geographical area, is classified as flood-prone. The government records an average annual flood-affected area of approximately 9.31 lakh hectares. It also reports that about 4.27 lakh hectares of land have been eroded by the Brahmaputra and its tributaries since 1950, with average annual erosion estimated at around 8,000 hectares.

These figures are often presented as engineering statistics. They should instead be read as a record of social displacement.

A hectare lost to erosion may contain a field that supported a family, a house built over decades, a village road, a school or a community landscape. When erosion repeatedly forces households to relocate, the loss is not simply the value of land recorded in a revenue register. It involves social networks, cultural memory, livelihoods and a sense of belonging.

The Assam government itself notes that erosion has significantly affected agricultural land and the rural economy. It also records the widening and changing morphology of the Brahmaputra over successive surveys. The river’s physical geography is therefore not static, and neither is the human geography built around it.

This is where the language of climate justice becomes tangible.

A family that loses land to erosion does not experience a statistic. It experiences displacement.

A farmer who watches fertile soil disappear does not experience a graph. The farmer experiences economic loss.

A community repeatedly rebuilding after floods does not experience an abstract adaptation challenge. It experiences a continuing disruption of ordinary life.

The climate justice equation

The central moral difficulty of climate change is that responsibility and vulnerability are distributed so unevenly. The IPCC’s historical emissions figures make the first half of that equation clear. The geography of floods, heat, drought, glacier instability and sea-level rise makes the second half visible.

This is why the debate over Loss and Damage has become one of the most consequential issues in international climate diplomacy. Adaptation can reduce risk, but it cannot eliminate every consequence. An early-warning system can save lives, but it cannot restore a village already destroyed by a landslide. A stronger embankment can reduce flood exposure, but it cannot recreate land already carried away by a river. A resilient bridge can improve connectivity, but it cannot compensate completely for the social and economic consequences of displacement.

The establishment of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage was therefore an important institutional development within the UN climate regime. But creating an institution is only the beginning. The difficult questions concern the scale of funding, the speed of access, the sources of finance and whether vulnerable countries and communities can actually receive support when they need it.

Climate finance more broadly will be central to COP31. At COP29 in Baku, governments agreed a new collective quantified goal calling for developed countries to take the lead in mobilising at least US$300 billion annually for developing countries by 2035, while also calling for efforts by all actors to scale up finance from public and private sources to at least US$1.3 trillion annually by 2035. The numbers are large, but so is the scale of the transformation required.

The problem is not simply that developing countries need money. They need predictable finance that can be converted into functioning infrastructure, resilient agriculture, early-warning systems, clean energy, public transport, health protection, water security and locally appropriate adaptation.

Without that, climate plans risk becoming documents rather than instruments of change.

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The implementation gap

This is perhaps the most important challenge for COP31.

The world does not lack climate plans. It lacks sufficient implementation.

UNEP’s 2025 Emissions Gap Report demonstrates the problem. Even full implementation of current NDCs would leave the world on a trajectory of approximately 2.3°C to 2.5°C warming this century, while current policies point towards around 2.8°C. UNEP calculates that global emissions would need to fall by approximately 55 per cent from 2019 levels by 2035 to align with a 1.5°C pathway.

The implication is not that diplomacy has failed completely. Global climate policy has produced important changes. Renewable energy has expanded dramatically, electric vehicles are becoming mainstream in many markets, energy efficiency has improved in several sectors and countries have established increasingly sophisticated climate policies.

The problem is one of speed and scale.

The climate system responds to cumulative emissions, while politics often operates on electoral cycles, annual budgets and short-term economic pressures. The result is a mismatch between the timescale of atmospheric change and the timescale of political decision-making.

COP31 will therefore have to confront a simple but difficult question: how can governments convert long-term climate commitments into decisions that are implemented within the next few years?

That means finance, technology, institutions and accountability.

It also means making climate policy part of ordinary development planning rather than treating it as a separate environmental agenda.

Assam belongs in this conversation

This is where the experience of Assam becomes relevant to the global debate.

The state is not simply a passive recipient of climate impacts. It is developing its own policy responses, including the Assam Cooling Action Plan, and is increasingly confronting questions of heat, humidity, energy demand, resilient infrastructure, forests, water and sustainable urbanisation.

The recently launched Assam Cooling Action Plan is significant precisely because cooling is often treated as a private household issue rather than a climate-policy issue. As temperatures rise, demand for air conditioning and refrigeration increases, which in turn increases electricity demand. If that electricity is generated from carbon-intensive sources and cooling equipment relies on high-impact refrigerants, a feedback loop can emerge in which a warmer world creates more demand for technologies that themselves contribute to warming.

A state-level cooling strategy therefore connects household comfort with energy efficiency, refrigerant management, public health, infrastructure and emissions reduction. For Assam, where high temperatures coexist with intense humidity, cooling is increasingly connected to productivity, health and the ability of people to live and work safely.

This is precisely the kind of local implementation that global climate diplomacy needs to encourage. The UN can negotiate targets. National governments can establish frameworks. But states, cities and communities have to make climate action real.

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The test of Antalya

COP31 will ultimately be judged by the political language emerging from Antalya, but its deeper importance lies in whether it can help narrow the widening distance between climate promises and climate reality.

The Türkiye-Australia arrangement creates an unusual diplomatic architecture. Türkiye will preside over the conference while Australia leads the negotiations, and the Pacific will have an important role in the pre-COP process. Whether this arrangement becomes a strength will depend on how effectively the two presidencies manage differences while maintaining the confidence of developing countries and vulnerable states.

The negotiations will inevitably involve competing priorities. Developed economies will emphasise investment, technology, industrial transition and energy security. Developing countries will continue to demand greater finance, technology transfer, adaptation support and recognition of differentiated responsibilities. Fossil-fuel-producing economies will resist policies that they believe threaten economic stability, while climate-vulnerable countries will insist that delay has become increasingly dangerous.

None of these concerns can simply be wished away.

The challenge is to find a political settlement capable of reducing emissions rapidly without reproducing old inequalities in a new form.

That is why climate justice cannot be reduced to rhetoric. It must become visible in the design of finance, the distribution of technology, the architecture of adaptation and the mechanisms created to address irreversible loss.

The Himalaya offers a powerful warning. The Brahmaputra offers another. The Pacific offers a third.

They are geographically distant, but scientifically and politically connected.

Beyond the conference hall

There is a tendency to think of climate diplomacy as something that happens in distant conference centres, surrounded by flags, negotiating rooms and carefully worded communiqués. Yet the real climate negotiations are increasingly taking place outside those rooms, in the landscapes where people are already adapting to changes they did not choose.

They are taking place in Nepal’s mountain valleys, where a collapsing slope can transform a river into a destructive debris flow. They are taking place along the Brahmaputra, where erosion can remove thousands of hectares of land over time. They are taking place in Pacific islands threatened by rising seas and in cities where heat is becoming an increasingly serious public-health risk.

The WMO’s temperature projections show that the next five years are likely to remain exceptionally warm, while UNEP’s emissions assessment demonstrates that current policies are still insufficient to keep warming within the Paris temperature goals. The scientific evidence therefore leaves little room for complacency.

Yet there is also reason not to surrender to fatalism.

Every fraction of a degree avoided matters. Every early-warning system that saves lives matters. Every restored wetland that absorbs floodwater matters. Every efficient building that reduces electricity demand matters. Every forest protected from degradation matters. Every tonne of methane prevented, every renewable-energy project brought online and every vulnerable community given the resources to adapt contributes to a less dangerous future.

The choice before the world is therefore not between optimism and pessimism. It is between implementation and delay.

COP31 cannot solve climate change in two weeks. No conference can. But it can help determine whether the international system remains capable of acting collectively when the scientific evidence is becoming more urgent and the political environment more fragmented.

For Assam and the Eastern Himalaya, the outcome will matter even if the people most affected never enter the negotiating rooms.

The Brahmaputra will continue to flow. The Himalaya will continue to rise and erode. The monsoon will continue to arrive. But the risks surrounding them are changing. The question is whether human institutions can change quickly enough as well.

That is ultimately what COP31 is about. Not another declaration, not another photograph of leaders, and not another promise postponed to a later year, but whether the world can begin closing the distance between the places where climate decisions are made and the places where their consequences are lived.

For the people of the Eastern Himalaya and the Brahmaputra basin, that distance has already become a measure of justice.

Sources and References

1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Road to Antalya: COP31, Türkiye and Australia Partnership. UNFCCC, 2026. The official COP31 process, Antalya dates, Türkiye-Australia partnership and implementation agenda.
2. UNFCCC. Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings: COP31/CMP21/CMA8. FCCC/SBI/2026/4, 2026. Official documentation describing Türkiye’s COP presidency and Australia’s role in leading the negotiations.
3. UNFCCC. COP31 Türkiye-Australia Partnership Modalities. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2025. The formal framework establishing the division of responsibilities between the Turkish COP Presidency and Australian President of Negotiations.
4. UNFCCC. UN Climate Change Conference, Antalya, November 2026. Official COP31 portal, including the Pre-COP process involving Fiji, Tuvalu and Australia.
5. World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Global Annual to Decadal Climate Update 2026–2035. WMO, 28 May 2026. Provides the latest projections for global temperatures during 2026–2030, including the 91% probability of at least one temporary exceedance of 1.5°C.
6. World Meteorological Organization (WMO). New Report Suggests More Global Temperature Records Ahead. 28 May 2026. Background on the continued exceptional warmth expected during the next five years.
7. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Emissions Gap Report 2025: Off Target. UNEP, November 2025. The report projects approximately 2.3–2.5°C warming under full implementation of current NDCs and approximately 2.8°C under current policies.
8. UNEP. Emissions Gap Report 2025: Key Messages. United Nations Environment Programme, 2025. Particularly relevant to the discussion of the 1.5°C overshoot and the scale of emissions reductions required by 2035.
9. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change, Working Group III, Chapter 2: Emissions Trends and Drivers. IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. This is the principal source for the historical emissions and equity data used in the article.
10. IPCC. AR6 Working Group III, Technical Summary. The IPCC assessment reports that developed countries contributed approximately 57% of cumulative CO₂ fossil-fuel and industry emissions between 1850 and 2019, while least-developed countries contributed approximately 0.4%.
11. IPCC. AR6 Working Group III, Summary for Policymakers. Particularly relevant to regional differences in per-capita emissions, historical responsibility and the distribution of climate mitigation burdens.
12. IPCC. Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change, Chapter 4: Mitigation and Development Pathways in the Near to Mid-Term. The assessment of the implementation gap between national pledges and actual emissions pathways informs the article’s discussion of the implementation crisis.
13. IPCC. AR6 Working Group III, Chapter 6: Energy Systems. Relevant to the article’s discussion of fossil fuels, electricity, energy-system transformation and the unequal distribution of per-capita emissions.
14. UNFCCC. COP29 UN Climate Conference Agrees to Triple Finance to Developing Countries. 24 November 2024. Source for the new climate-finance goal of at least US$300 billion annually by 2035 and the broader US$1.3 trillion annual mobilisation ambition.
15. UNFCCC. Climate Finance Will Benefit Billions. Remarks by Executive Secretary Simon Stiell, June 2026. Relevant to the discussion of moving from climate plans to implementation and the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap to US$1.3 trillion.
16. Government of Assam, Water Resources Department. River System of Assam. Official state data on Assam’s flood-prone area, annual flood impacts, erosion and the Brahmaputra-Barak river systems.
17. Government of Assam, Water Resources Department. Flood & Erosion Problems. Official data documenting approximately 4.27 lakh hectares of land eroded since 1950 and the continuing impacts of flash floods and riverbank erosion.
18. WRI India. State-Level Celebration of World Ozone Day 2026 and Launch of Assam Cooling Action Plan. World Resources Institute India, September 2026. Principal source for the Assam Cooling Action Plan, its four priority sectors and projected cooling electricity demand.
19. WRI India and Assam Climate Change Management Society (ACCMS). Assam Cooling Action Plan. 2026. State-level framework translating the India Cooling Action Plan into Assam-specific strategies for buildings, cold chain, industry and transport.
20. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India. India Cooling Action Plan (ICAP). Government of India, 2019. The national policy framework from which state-level cooling strategies such as ACAP are being developed.
21. UN Environment Programme / Ozone Secretariat. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. United Nations Environment Programme. Background source for the international ozone regime and the evolution of global cooperation on ozone protection.
22. UNEP Ozone Secretariat. Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. United Nations Environment Programme. Background on the phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons and the connection between ozone protection, energy efficiency and climate mitigation.
23. International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD). Regional assessments and scientific reporting on the Hindu Kush Himalaya, including glacier change, cryospheric instability, floods, landslides and downstream vulnerability.
24. ICIMOD. The Hindu Kush Himalaya Assessment. Relevant to the article’s discussion of the region’s changing glaciers, snow, water systems and the vulnerability of downstream populations.
25. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Climate Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth. National Academies Press, 2021. Relevant background for the broader scientific debate on climate intervention and solar radiation modification.
26. NASA Earth Observatory. Earth-observation datasets and analysis relating to global temperature, glaciers, floods, land-use change and the changing cryosphere.
27. Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). Climate and Environmental Monitoring / Earth Observation Programme. Satellite-based observations relevant to glaciers, land cover, water systems and environmental change in the Indian Himalayan region.
28. Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology (IITM). Research and climate assessments concerning Indian temperature trends, monsoon variability, extreme precipitation and regional climate change.
29. Indian Institute of Science (IISc). Research on Himalayan cryosphere, extreme weather, hydrology, climate variability and environmental change in the Indian subcontinent.
30. Friedlingstein, P. et al. Global Carbon Budget. Earth System Science Data. The underlying emissions datasets are among those incorporated into IPCC assessments of historical and contemporary carbon emissions.

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