Hungary’s energy dependence on Russia: why It will be difficult even after the 2026 elections

Hungary’s energy dependence on Russia: why It will be difficult even after the 2026 elections

Olha Konsevych

The defeat of Viktor Orbán in the elections and the rise to power of Péter Magyar, leader of Hungary’s opposition party “Tisza,” opened a new political chapter for the country.

However, energy policy is one of the few areas where a change of government does not imply rapid transformation. Dependence on Russia, built over decades, proves to be far more resilient than any political cycle. Addressing his supporters, Magyar stated: “Today, Hungarians said ‘yes’ to Europe, they said ‘yes’ to a free Hungary,” and also called on representatives of state institutions loyal to Orbán to resign.

Péter Magyar is developing a comprehensive plan to normalize relations with the European Union after 16 years of rule by Russia’s key ally in Europe. At the same time, Hungary will continue to purchase Russian oil, even though sanctions are expected to remain in place. Speaking at a press conference on Monday, April 13, Magyar adopted a pragmatic stance.

“This undermines our competitiveness. It is sometimes easy to make loud statements – I understand the moral aspects and questions of principle, and like everyone else, I support the protection of human rights. But we should not shoot ourselves in the foot. We will seek to purchase oil and gas from as many sources as possible,” he said.

In his view, buying raw materials at high prices is “not in the interest” of the EU when Russia is a neighboring supplier. “Sometimes sanctions are eased, because otherwise the global economy could collapse, and countries could go bankrupt due to oil shortages. But as soon as the war ends – and we hope negotiations will be successful and this will happen soon – Europe will immediately lift sanctions,” Magyar expressed hope.

At the same time, he noted that he would not call Vladimir Putin, a close ally of Orbán, although he would speak with him if the Russian leader initiated contact.

Dependence on Russia as a vulnerability

Hungary remains deeply tied to Russia in the energy sector. For example, Russian crude oil dependence has surged from 61% to 93% since 2021.

The main alternative for Hungary, explicitly highlighted by the European Commission, is the Adria oil pipeline in Croatia, Serbia, and Hungary, with branch lines to Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This infrastructure is already integrated into the European energy system and is capable of supplying non-Russian oil to Central Europe. Accordingly, the issue of diversification is not the absence of routes, but the willingness to use them.

Moreover, the economic argument in favor of alternatives appears equally compelling. According to the Centre for the Study of Democracy, transit tariffs for non-Russian oil via the Adriatic route are lower than for Russian crude transported through the Druzhba pipeline: approximately €12 per tonne compared to €21 per tonne, respectively.

This directly contradicts the argument that abandoning Russian oil automatically leads to economic losses. On the contrary, in some cases, alternative routes may even be more cost-effective – provided there is sufficient political will to scale them up.

A strategic energy asset under Russian control

The International Energy Agency has long noted that Hungary “needs to reduce its high vulnerability and dependence on Russia in gas, oil, and nuclear energy through policies that lower fossil fuel consumption, improve energy efficiency, and promote investment in clean energy technologies.”

The Paks Nuclear Power Plant, located about 100 kilometers south of Budapest, currently operates four Soviet-designed reactors. They were commissioned between 1982 and 1987. In early 2014, a Hungarian-Russian intergovernmental agreement was signed under which Russian companies were to supply two VVER-1200 reactors for the Paks II project. The agreement also предусмотрed a Russian state loan of up to €10 billion to finance 80% of the project’s cost.

The state corporation Rosatom, which is responsible for construction, stated at the stage of obtaining a permit to pour the first concrete that the licenses “confirm the project’s compliance with strict international, European, and national nuclear safety requirements.” In reality, however, the excavation site where the future unit is being built is already showing alarming signs of degradation. Cracks, ochre deposits, and the characteristic smell of hydrogen sulfide are not random defects, but symptoms of deeper processes that threaten the durability of the entire structure.

Magyar has also stated that his government will analyze and, if necessary, revise all agreements related to the Paks II nuclear power plant project. It should be recalled that in 2022, Hungary’s nuclear regulator granted Rosatom a construction license for the fifth and sixth power units as part of the Paks II project. The license is valid for ten years.

Hungary’s election result: why it is important to remain vigilant

Many observers point to the 12-point plan signed shortly before the elections between Budapest and Moscow on deepening cooperation as a typical “political legacy” of the Viktor Orbán era. Formally, this document sets out a course for strategic rapprochement, but in practice it may outlive a change of government largely by inertia.

Cooperation with Russia in areas such as gas, nuclear fuel, or large-scale infrastructure projects cannot be quickly dismantled without significant economic losses and technical risks. Therefore, even in the event of a political shift in Budapest, these arrangements are likely to be transformed rather than eliminated: they will move into a less public, more pragmatic domain, where the priority will shift from geopolitics to ensuring continuity of supply.

By contrast, the humanitarian and symbolic dimensions of these agreements – from educational initiatives to exchange programs – are far less resilient and will likely become the first casualties of policy revision. These elements are most closely tied to the political signaling of rapprochement and stand in the sharpest contrast to EU expectations.

Former Ukrainian MP and journalist, now an expert on anti-corruption reforms, Mustafa Nayyem, advised against rushing to give Péter Magyar the benefit of the doubt. “He did not grow up alongside Orbán’s system, but within it, and he is not someone who came from the outside to dismantle this model to its foundations. Magyar is a former insider who was himself part of this structure for a long time, and during the campaign he at times quite consciously used Orbán-style aesthetics,

Orbán-style caution, and Orbán-style instincts – just in a more modern packaging. Of course, it would be good if he turned out to be different, but the risk is precisely that Hungary may get not the end of Orbánism, but its modified, more polished and aggrieved version,” he wrote on Facebook.

Olha Konsevych: Journalist, researcher; Vital Voices; GMF; WZB Berlin ;  Max Planck Society alumna ;Mahabahu Correspondent

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