Washington after Anchorage: Security Guarantees without Membership and an Agreement without Silence
Glib Ostapenko
On August 18, Washington hosted a meeting that may prove to be the most consequential diplomatic episode of the summer. Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived at the White House accompanied by a group of European leaders to discuss with Donald Trump the future security architecture for Ukraine.
For the first time in months, the format of negotiations was deliberately public: the Europeans acted as a safeguard against a bilateral “deal-making” scenario, while the meeting itself came on the heels of the Anchorage watershed, when Trump shifted his approach after a three-hour conversation with Vladimir Putin in Alaska.
Whereas previously he had insisted that any peace settlement must begin with a ceasefire, his new message was that negotiations can take place while the war continues.
This shift expands the space for political maneuvering but simultaneously creates serious risks for both Ukraine and Europe: without a cessation of hostilities, any agreement remains precarious by definition.
For Kyiv, the presence of allies was essential. Ursula von der Leyen, Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz, Keir Starmer, Giorgia Meloni, Alexander Stubb, and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte all joined specifically to prevent a scenario in which Ukraine’s fate would be shaped in a purely bilateral format. Europe’s logic is straightforward: security guarantees may serve as a temporary substitute for NATO membership, but they must be “ironclad” and contain clear triggers. Otherwise, Ukraine would be left with a political declaration rather than a genuine system of deterrence.
The divergence in approaches was evident. The White House is moving toward a political agreement without a preliminary ceasefire, hoping to formalize a framework of guarantees within a week or two. Europe insists that at least a minimal regime of silence on the battlefield is a prerequisite for any subsequent construction.
Ukraine, for its part, accepts negotiations but only if the guarantees include an integrated air and missile defense system and accelerated rearmament, while rejecting any territorial concessions outright. Moscow, meanwhile, is raising the stakes: its demand for full control over the remainder of Donetsk region was presented as the minimum “entry ticket” to political discussions.
At the same time, the Kremlin has been pushing the idea of an “air truce” – a limitation on aerial strikes without halting ground operations. This would allow Russia to consolidate the front and buy time to regroup resources in the rear, which Ukraine has been systematically targeting.
In August alone, Ukraine struck 26 targets across Russia, including major oil refineries (Ryazan, Novokuybyshevsk, Afipsky, Syzran, Saratov, Volgograd, Ukhta, Lukoil-Volgogradneftepererabotka), key oil infrastructure (Rosneft-Kuban, Bryansk, Millerovo), the Nevinnomyssk chemical plant, and the Elabuga logistics terminal named after Deng Xiaoping in Tatarstan.
Strikes also hit strategic defense-industrial sites such as the Arzamas Aviation Components Plant and the Monokristall crystal factory, along with vital railway hubs (Volgograd, Lisky, Tatchinskaya, Surovikino) and even a vessel in Astrakhan carrying Shahed components – underscoring one of Ukraine’s most extensive campaigns yet against Russian military, energy, and transport infrastructure.

An additional layer of the talks focused on economics. Kyiv proposed a large-scale package of U.S. arms procurement worth $100 billion, to be financed primarily by Europe. The rationale is evident: long-term contracts with the United States create a foundation for security guarantees while accelerating the establishment of an “air shield” over Ukraine.
For Europe, this also represents an opportunity to convert financial support into a tangible security architecture, thereby reducing strategic dependence on Washington’s political mood swings. Yet the risks are equally clear – delivery timelines, competition among systems, and, above all, whether this architecture can become effective before the Kremlin adapts its tactics.
Symbolically, it was Secretary of State Marco Rubio who received the mandate to lead the working group on guarantees. According to several European sources, four core components are on the table: integrated air and missile defense, accelerated weapons deliveries, mechanisms for monitoring violations, and the option of limited allied military presence in non-combat roles. These technical elements are meant to transform a political agreement into a functioning mechanism rather than another declaration of goodwill.
European leaders sought to delineate their “red lines” as clearly as possible. Merz stated openly that further steps are possible only if at least a basic ceasefire is achieved. Macron insisted that Europe must be a full-fledged participant in the negotiation format, not merely a financial donor. Meloni supported the concept of guarantees “akin to Article 5,” while Rutte underlined that NATO membership is not a realistic option at this stage. Starmer called the talks constructive, emphasizing the unity of European capitals.
Uncertainty, however, remains significant. Who exactly would decide on triggering assistance in case of violations, and what the “snapback” sanctions mechanisms would look like? Europeans worry that without automatic triggers, any guarantees risk devolving into yet another political compromise. For Ukraine, timing is crucial: will the new contracts and air defense systems take effect quickly enough, or will Russia exploit the interim uncertainty?
Moscow’s position remains uncompromising. Its demand regarding Donetsk is coupled with the proposal of an “air truce,” which Western analysts regard more as a tactical maneuver than a genuine peace initiative. At the core of Russia’s bargaining lies a striking asymmetry: despite occupying only about 1% of Sumy region and 4% of Kharkiv region – mostly small villages and rural settlements where Ukrainian forces have even carried out limited counteroffensive actions – the Kremlin is attempting to exchange these marginal holdings for full control of Donetsk region, where it currently controls roughly 76% of the territory. In essence, this would mean Russia gaining an additional 24% of one of Ukraine’s most densely populated industrial regions in return for just 5%.
On the Sumy and Kharkiv fronts, Russia controls only small, sparsely populated areas, while in Donetsk its claims extend to major urban agglomerations that remain under Ukrainian control – Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Kostyantynivka, and Pokrovsk. These cities are not only strategic industrial hubs but also gateways: their capture would open the path for further offensives into Dnipropetrovsk region.
Should international circumstances shift, Russia could use such a foothold to advance deeper into Ukraine, targeting cities such as Lozova in Kharkiv region and, within Dnipropetrovsk region, Pavlohrad, Petropavlivka, Shakhtarske, and Mezhova, thereby undermining the stability of central and eastern Ukraine. As history demonstrates, no agreement with Moscow is worth the paper it is written on: any “ceasefire” tends to become nothing more than a tactical pause.

For Kyiv, accepting such a scenario would mean losing the ability to strike at Russia’s rear while the Russian army continued to press on the ground.
The next ten days will determine whether Rubio’s group can present an initial draft of guarantees addressing the critical questions: which systems will be integrated into Ukraine’s defense, how automatic triggers for assistance will function, and what the delivery structures will look like.
In parallel, a direct Zelenskyy–Putin contact is being discussed on a neutral European platform, with the prospect of a future trilateral summit involving the United States. Militarily, the test is straightforward: will Russia reduce the intensity of its strikes on Ukrainian cities, or will it use the negotiation track solely as cover for tactical maneuvering?
Washington has opened a window of opportunity, but it is a narrow one. The United States seeks a rapid political outcome; Europe wants guarantees durable enough to withstand changes in Washington; Ukraine demands real systems, not symbolic gestures. The Kremlin is betting on time, probing Western flexibility and bargaining over territory.
The only viable exit from this narrow corridor is through an agreement that combines rigorous verification, automatic consequences, and the rapid conversion of funds into military capability.
Success will not be measured by leaders’ photographs but by a concrete document with triggers and the first signed contracts. Failure would mean a lack of specificity and the dilution of peace into nothing more than “air pauses.”
Glib Ostapenko, Foreign policy expert, founder of OSTAPENKO, Political Consulting, and Correspondent- Mahabahu from Ukraine.
19-08-2025
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